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Dangerous tendencies in the growth of clericalism in the Russian Army
"Army and politics", М., 2002

Sergey Mozgovoy
16.06.2002

Changes in Russia's social, political, and economic systems have affected its armed forces. The ideological vacuum that formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to fundamental shift in the spirituality of the Russian people, including the military.

Numerous parties and movements that appeared in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s, along with the ruling powers, turned to the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations as a means to achieve political goals. They mobilized the media to advertise religious ideas and values, achieving considerable success.

Government and society started connecting the search for a national identity with religion, especially with "traditional" confessions. People hoped that this national identity would help Russia find a way out from its deep, widespread crisis. This helped to change the religious situation, and fostered growth of organizations and people who consider themselves religious. In 1992, the Russian Orthodox had 2,880 registered organizations, in 1993 there were 4,566, in 1997 – 7,195, and in 2000 – 9236. [1] The same tendencies are found in Islam in Russia: on January 1, 1992 there were 1,216 Muslim organizations, and in 2000 there were 3,098. [2] New religious movements grew especially quickly, for example organizations of the Jehovah's Witnesses, charismatic churches. In total, on the December 31, 2000 there were 20,215 registered religious organizations in Russia. About eleven thousand of them were Russian Orthodox, 3048 – Muslim, 278 congregations of Old Believers, 258 Roman Catholic, 197 Jewish, 195 Buddhist. [3] Believers of these and of other 58 registered denominations have appeared in Russia's armed forces.

According to military sociologists, one third of Russia's military consider themselves as belonging to some faith, although many of them do not fulfill the minimum requirements that their faith requires from its followers. Not more than 3 to 5 percent actively practice their religion, visiting churches and taking part in religious rituals. Only 10 percent of believers feel the need to visit houses of worship, and a large part even doubts the existence of God. For many, self-identification is connected with the need for identification with the nation and its people. This became especially real after the destruction of the USSR and subsequent creation of Russian statehood. In 1998-2001 the servicemen interest in religious matters fell. However, the number of churches being built on military installations, along with the amount of military rituals that include religious leadership and ceremonies did not decrease, but rather increased. This is explained by the increasingly widespread contacts between military leadership and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church.

At the same time, religious minorities and the unreligious part of society began to experience increasing discomfort. Even traditional faiths like Old Believers and Muslims were not immune. Symptoms of this discomfort can be seen in the form of open religious behavior in the army, culture, media, educational system, and in governmental organs. Politicians display their religious preferences, while conducting public worship services in and "dedicating" government facilities has become widespread. Top government officials advertise their participation in religious ceremonies, and religious rites have been introduced into the military ritual oath of allegiance, a practice that directly violates the regulations of the armed forces.

As the army is a part of society, it is affected by societal religious trends. The relations between Russian armed forces and religious organizations mirror those between government and religion. In the former USSR, the government encouraged atheism, while strictly restricting freedom of religion and the activities of religious groups. In contemporary Russia, relations between government and religion are characterized by growth of interest toward religion and its role in history, as well as religious traditions, holidays, and rites. Religion is losing its image of relic of past ages and of impediment to societal development. People begin to view religion as an important institution of society. This process has affected the army as well. Commanders are now required to consider the religious needs of their soldiers. This, along with official demonstrations of religious preference from the President of Russia, has pushed the high army command into establishing contacts with the leadership of religious organizations, mostly the Russian Orthodox Church. These contacts were formalized in agreements between ministries and agencies, in public speeches by military leaders, and in the media.

The leadership of the army felt the need to find new approaches to training the soldiers, which led to a search for new forms and methods to develop partnerships with religious organizations, especially with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the March 2, 1994 Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, along with Patriarch Alexy II, signed a joint declaration on cooperation between the Russian armed forces and the Russian Orthodox Church. Similar agreements were consequently signed between the Church and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Border Service, Ministry for Emergency Management, Ministry of Atomic Power, the Chief Administration of Kazak Forces under the President of the Russian Federation, as well as others.

This joint declaration was not received warmly by everybody and resulted in numerous complaints to the Ministry of Defense. Many saw it as an attempt to fuse the Orthodox Church with the army, especially because of the inferior status of other denominations. Three years later Russian Minister of Defense Igor Rodionovy and Patriarch Alexy II signed a new agreement, which widened the partnership and increased cooperation between the army and the Orthodox Church. The "Red Star" newspaper reported that a high rank official of Russia's Ministry of Defense Cherkasov, announced that joint acts of the army and other religious denominations would occur only through the Army Relations Committee of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Leaders of governmental ministries and agencies saw that the country's leadership had made a decision to work with the Russian Orthodox Church. According to their plans, adopting a religious worldview should guarantee control over social and governmental institutions, including the army. Creating a national, patriotic image connected with religion should legitimize those in power, endowing them with authority in the eyes of the people.

For over a thousand years, positions of secular power in Russia were sanctioned and sanctified by the state religion. Relations between government and Church implied "special partnership," of those in power with the Church bureaucracy, in which both sides profited. In Russia, that partnership formed an intolerant ideology excluding any diversity. [4] This was concealed under a slogan "The rebirth of Russian spirituality and the tradition of self-sacrificing service to the Motherland." The problem is that this ideology is that of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Theological subjects began to be taught in military academies. In 1996 a department of Orthodox Culture was created in the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy of Rocket Forces, now called Peter the Great Military Academy. Similar departments were opened in educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Courses on the cooperation between the Russian army and the Russian Orthodox Church were placed in the curricula of societal-governmental training for the military. At these courses special attention is paid not only to the glorious traditions of military courage and genius of the Russian soldiers, but also to "the harm and dangers of eastern philosophies and cults for the military and members of their families." Some of the most peaceful and "innocent" faiths are included among these "dangerous" ideologies. In some military units, the theme of "pseudospirituality" is taught. During these courses, many legally registered religious organizations are incorrectly labeled as "cults." Such teachings inflame religious intolerance and contradict the constitutional foundations of Russia.

An absurd situation has resulted from this poorly thought-out interaction between Russia's armed forces and religious organizations. Since only representatives of the Russian Church are admitted into army barracks, some followers of other faiths, as well as non-religious people say, "Your army is Orthodox, so let Orthodox people serve in it." [5] This is an especially cutting remark because of the many times "conscientious draft-dodgers" have been denied their request to serve in an alternative service. The Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees this right, but since there is no law in Russia providing for alternative service, it is not uncommon for "conscientious draft-dodgers" to fall under criminal indictment for dodging their service in the army. Verdicts in these cases are contradictory. Unfortunately, the courts do not always accept the Constitution of the Russian Federation as applicable in this situation, and so the rights of young men to an alternative service are not always defended. Some times the courts base their decisions on some sort of "higher governmental interests in homeland defense," dictated by the army leadership. In such cases, decisions are not in favor of "conscientious draft-dodgers." These decisions have created a group of "prisoners of conscience," people whose religious and other freedoms are restricted, and whom the government has placed in opposition to itself. However, in spite of Russia's international responsibilities and the urgent need to pass the federal law "On alternative civil service," the issue has been delayed. The first reading of this bill in the Federal Duma took place in December 1994, but the parliament and government of the Russian Federation have been unsuccessful at finding a compromise. Accordingly, "conscientious draft-dodgers" cannot serve in any form – neither military nor alternative service is an option.

Orthodox young men have been designated into special military units. For example, there is an engineering unit of the Moscow military district, stationed at Arsaka in the region of Vladimir. This is not the only example. This is a threat to the armed forces' preparedness, since dividing troops into units based on religion could potentially destroy the army's unity. Such an infringement of scientifically based and legislatively mandated principles could possibly lead to a schism in the armed forces.

Russia's large Islamic community has reacted negatively to this special division for the Orthodox, and has started to call for the creation of separate units for Muslim soldiers. At a conference entitled "Islam in Russia" in 1997, representatives of the Islamic Ecclesiastical Administration of Tatarstan made public a letter to the Russian Ministry of Defense, in which they argued the necessity of creating Muslim military units. Instead of unity in the army, based on patriotic principles of love toward an ethnically and religiously diverse motherland, such practices lead to a serious division because of those very same principles. Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, head of the Council of Muftis of Russia wrote, "It is wrong to divide the army into units based on faith in an ethnically and religiously diverse state. If we have Christian divisions today, in the future we will need Muslim, Buddhist, and Jewish… If we have one Motherland, we need to defend it as one." [6]

Ryabtsev, a Russian military officer, is a leader of one of the Old Believers communities in Moscow and an adviser to Russian Orthodox Old Belief Church Metropolit Alimpy. According to him, "In the army today only one church plays an active role – the Russian Orthodox Church. It conducts worship services, mass consecrations of banners, ships and aircraft. However, it is important to remember that many faiths consider each other heretical and apostatized. It is wrong to force a man to serve under a banner that he considers defiled." [7]

The government's failure to think over its policies regarding freedom of conscience and religion will create even more problems in our army. Many denominations are starting to ask for agreements with the Russian Ministry of Defense, and other important ministries and agencies, similar to those already signed with the Russian Orthodox Church. Demands for the creation of an institute of military chaplains from many different religions are growing louder. "Christian symbolism" in state and military emblems offend Muslims. Sooner or later questions will arise about mullahs in the services, about taking Fridays off, the daily regimen of five prayers, pork in army rations, and so forth. [8]

The religious diversity among the military creates significant difficulties in providing equal conditions so that they could satisfy their religious needs. Cooperation between the army and the Russian Orthodox Church is close and can be characterized as a partnership with certain elements of protectionism. However, relations with other religious organizations differ, depending mostly on the sympathies and antipathies of local commanders. A special accent is placed on the "traditional character" of certain religions. Relations between the armed forces and Protestant or Muslim religions hardly exist, and between the army and Old Believers as well as newer religious movements they are completely nonexistent.

Several conflicts of religious origins exist in Russia neighboring countries. Russia and Russian armed forces should pay careful attention to religious issues and remain completely neutral towards all religions. Neglect of the religious factor or incompetent religious policy may become a destabilizing factor, inflaming inter-religious relations and nationalism.

These problems become especially worrisome when viewed in light of the religious xenophobia widespread in Russian society. Some "national-patriotic" organizations and religious groups make use of religious intolerance to carry on their ideological propaganda. In many military units, relations with the Church are founded on the ideas of the fundamentalist wing of the Russian Orthodox Church. Servicemen are impressed with the church's rhetoric, which in some ways makes up for the poor living conditions in the army, sharp reduction in its size, and its inability to effectively solve military problems. The naive idea that such rhetoric will meaningfully strengthen the army's morale is completely self-deceptive.

Lack of tolerance and equality in the army, as well as the anger created by the meager existence of the officer corps, who are unable to feed its families, the indifference and inattention to the fates of those who served in Chechnya (as it was with those who served in Afghanistan) combine to destabilize the army. Since the days of Boris Yeltsin top governmental officials have relied on a new group of commanders. These commanders have lost touch with the common people and with the army, which consists of "workers and peasants," including its junior and senior officers.

High military command made the decision to align with the Russian Orthodox Church in an attempt to keep the army under control and manipulate its soldiers. The danger of such a choice is obvious, since the Orthodox Church, which can exist only in a limited unity with the government, has been not only a government-forming, but also a government-destroying institution. Before the revolution the Russian Orthodox Church was the last bulwark of autocracy, categorically opposing the growing democratic reforms connected with the need to limit the monarchy, among which was freedom of religion. In 1917, the Church, trying to preserve the autocratic Orthodox system, sunk the "ship of Russian statehood."

Eighty years later, the lessons of history are forgotten. Many bureaucrats view freedom of religion not as freedom to choose one's world view, but as a western invention forced upon Russia by international treaties, having nothing to do with national traditions. The rector of the Syvato-Tikhonovskiy Theological Institute, Vladimir Vorobiev made this point in January 2001 at a Christmas seminar in the Military Academy of the General Command. New Orthodox churches are being built at a rapid rate within military units and military academies, the Orthodox Church dedicates military objects including ships and aircraft. According to the Russian Orthodox Church, in 2000 there were 117 Orthodox Churches on military garrisons, including those on military academies, 7 on Border Patrol bases, 20 on the territory of the Ministry of Emergency Management. This violates federal law, which states "Creating religious organizations in military units is not permitted." The Church obviously cannot exist without a group of members to support it, and this group is nothing else but a religious organization.

The leadership of the armed forces openly infringes the law, not worrying about any possible consequences. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation Russia is established as "secular government. No religion may serve as a state or mandated religion. Religious organizations are separated from the government and are equal before the law." However, to follow the principles of a secular government seems to have become bad taste. It is definitely connected to the government policies designed to privatize and concentrate power, bringing religion in as a central part of the government. [9] The Russian armed forces are a government institution, they follow the official policies of the Kremlin, which is emphasizing that the Russian Orthodox Church is the traditional ideological and spiritual institution of the Russian Empire, symbols of which have been restored to the Russian Federation.

Notwithstanding the loss of faith in Marxism-Leninism that most soldiers have experienced, an analysis of the interplay between the armed forces and religious organizations in the latter half of the twentieth century shows that religion has not been able to unite and consolidate the armed forces. Among the servicemen, 76 percent are Orthodox Christians, 10 percent are Muslim, 1.7 percent are Buddhist, 0.9 percent are Catholic, and 1.5 percent are Protestant18. In Russia there is no agreement between differing denominations – not only between differing Christian denominations, such as Catholic and Protestant, but also within Orthodoxy itself, which has at least 4 different branches.

Religious differences among the military, harsh competition between religious organizations in the battle to enlarge their congregations, and the growing politicization of religion combine to inflame inter-religious hostility and xenophobia. About 15 percent of soldiers surveyed have negative feelings towards leaders of non-Orthodox faiths, and about 15 percent have negative feelings towards Orthodoxy. [10]

It is not surprising that religion is used to create and strengthen an image of the enemy, finding in religion a rich source of such material. Much depends on the policies towards religion that are chosen by the government and the ruling party. Violations of religious freedom inflame nationalistic feelings, and make people receptive to extremists who seek to use religion to divide one people from another.

The clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church blesses the army during war, and for this reason, many commanders see the Church as their natural ally and counselor. The utilitarian approach to Orthodoxy as an ideological instrument turns a military opponent into a religious enemy, which nurtures religious conflict in Russia. The media also play a large part in this, playing the "Islamic" card by using such terms as "Islamic fighters," "warriors of Allah" and others. This exacerbates the situation by giving the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya a religious character.

The desire of those in command to rely on the Russian Orthodox Church for the army's spiritual and moral development has many negative consequences. Overall army instruction is negatively impacted by xenophobia towards other religions, military and economic resources of the armed forces and government are used to fight different religions. In this case, "Orthodox patriotism" is based on intolerance of other worldviews, aids Russian nationalism and feeds national chauvinism.

Top politicians and governmental officials provide a bad example by its flirtations with the Church. History shows that religion is often used in the armed forces in pursuit of political goals, as demonstrated by documents from the electoral campaign of 1996.

At the beginning of World War I, clergy in the army and navy had reached zenith of its organizational and material development. However, even then the clergy could not sustain morale in the army. Russia experienced more desertions from the fronts in World War I than in all her previous military history. Count Ignatiev, who served as the Russian military attache in France, vividly wrote about this problem in his memoirs "Fifty years in the Ranks." [11]

Unfortunately, the lessons and conclusions reached from Russia's pre-revolutionary past have been forgotten. The dominance of one ruling religion and lack of religious freedom led to the downfall of the Russian government in 1917.

After the passage of the federal law "On freedom of conscience and religious organizations" (1997), the government worked out bylaws and agreements on administrating this law. Some documents that resulted from these efforts view "fundamentalism" and "totalitarian religious cults" as threats to society. After the Russian President approved the Doctrine of Information Security, the Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Rushailo said, "The police and religious leaders should cooperate in opposing the growth of cults." This remark was given in October 2000 in the city of Volgograd, during the meeting with religious leaders. He mentioned that he had discussed questions of cooperation in the battle against cults with Patriarch Alexy II. In the last several years, a tendency towards the destruction of fundamental human rights has appeared in Russia, where xenophobia has become a part of government policy.

Current legal vacuum in regard to military-religious relations and systematic violation of the principles of religious freedom may lead to serious consequences for the army, Church, and Russia as a whole. The Church has offered itself to be used in political goals that are incompatible with the democratization of public life. In the Church's anti-democratic, chauvinistic voices are heard louder and louder, demanding union with nationalistic movements. All this combines to create a real danger of usurpation of power by a military regime, which will use the Orthodox Church for support in its feudal-monarchic views. This will all be accompanied by public relations campaigns calling for reliance on "civil society," in which "traditional denominations," along with public organizations under government control receive large privileges.

Joining the international antiterrorist coalition against the so-called "Islamic extremism" may contribute to the realization of such a scenario – Russia has already experienced a wave of Islamophobia. Not long ago, the government began liquidating or subordinating all independent media, enlarging and strengthening Kremlin-controlled political parties and weakening all others. One can say with some certainty that soon restricting civil liberties will appear on the government's agenda.

This is especially relevant because of the possible disturbances that might arise when the army is given police authority. This happened in October 1993 during the storming of the Russian Parliament, as well as during the Chechen war. The opinion of the Church on these matters is well known. In his address "To Orthodox young men who are called to serve in the army in 1995," Patriarch Alexy II called young recruits to fight not only against the external, but also internal enemies. The blessings given by Russian Orthodox priests to soldiers as they went to the Chechen war, plus the fact that mass media called the Chechen opposition "Islamic fundamentalists" combine to give the Chechen conflict a religious background of Christians against Muslims. It is important to note that the Russian Orthodox Church strove to give this military operation the image of a battle to save Orthodoxy.

Today we witness a "crawling growth of clericalism" from several directions in many governmental organizations, including the armed forces. This tendency is aimed against both society and the government. Russia needs to reject this latest attempt to put religious ideology in the armed forces. Restricting the government's use of religious organizations for political goals will assist military reforms, which will speed democratization of society in general.

Notes
  1. Information on religious organizations registered in the Russian Federation (1993-2000), Moscow, 2000.
  2. Ibidem.
  3. "Registration is over: Will there be problems for religious organizations?" Religion and Law, no. 1, 2001, p. 7.
  4. S.A. Boryanov, "Over-religiousness in the government as a violation of human rights and freedoms is yielding to the constitutional structure of the Russian Federation," Law and Politics, no. 9, 2000, p. 139.
  5. I.V. Podberezsky, "Where and to whom should we pray?" Religion and the Law, no. 6, 2000, p. 19.
  6. Church Public Bulletin, February 13, 1997, p. 2.
  7. NG Religion, April 28, 1999.
  8. I.V. Podberezsky, op. cit., p. 19.
  9. S.A. Boryanov, "Legal basis, contents, and the guaranties of the freedom of conscience (religion)," Government and Law, no. 2, 2001, p. 26.
  10. S.A. Mozgovoy, "Sociological analysis of the religious situation in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," Religion: the Church in Russia and Abroad, no. 9-10, 1997, p. 115.
  11. A.A. Ignatyev, "Fifty Years in the Ranks," Moscow, 1998.
  12. Red Star, October 24, 1995.




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